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For many conditions and in many countries, medical care falls
short of what should be provided. Although high quality care
depends crucially on the professionalism of doctors, this has
not proved sufficient to ensure universal high quality care, and
as a consequence payers have looked towards incentives as one
way of further improving quality. In 2004 the UK National
Health Service introduced the world’s largest healthcare related
pay-for-performance scheme into primary care, the Quality and
Outcomes Framework (QOF). Primary care doctors were paid
up to 25% more if they met a complex set of clinical and
organisational indicators.1 The scheme was a national one with
no opportunity for local variations to tackle particular local
healthcare needs.
Although the scheme was initially popular, general practitioners
(GPs) have become increasingly disenchanted, especially with
the substantial administrative workload at a time of rising
clinical demand, and there are concerns about reduced time for
aspects of care that are not readily measured. Parts of England
have been allowed to opt out of the scheme, and Scotland is
dropping QOF in favour of quality circles (groups of GPs
working together to improve quality).2What can other countries
learn from the UK’s experience of pay for performance? We
set out some principles and caveats for the development and
introduction of pay for performance as a tool for quality
improvement.
How should quality of care bemeasured?
The first problem in developing any pay-for-performance
scheme is to decide how to measure quality of care. The
development of clinical indicators is itself a science.
Considerable skill is needed to develop clear reliable and valid
indicators with clinical relevance that also meet administrative
or managerial needs, and there are hundreds of possible quality
indicators (the Brazilian pay-for-performance scheme in primary
care has over 1000). However, if the scheme is too large and
cumbersome it will be complex to administer and difficult for
clinicians to understand—a factor which itself can be
demotivating.3 In contrast, a scheme with a small number of
indicators may lead doctors to prioritise a limited range of
aspects of care. Quality improvement schemes that depend on
measurement will inevitably tend to prioritise aspects of care
that are easy to measure, potentially at the expense of care which
is equally or more important.
The UK’s scheme started with a focus on clinical care,
organisational aspects of care, and patient experience (box 1).
The clinical indicators developed and expanded to include more
conditions over the years, but the organisational indicators were
dropped in 2012 when virtually all practices scored 100%. The
indicators for patient experience were changed several times
but were never really successfully implemented (see examples
in box 2).
There is no optimum size for a pay-for-performance scheme; it
will depend on the nature and scale of the challenges to be
addressed. For example, the UK’s first scheme providing
incentives for childhood immunisation and cervical cytology
coverage had just three indicators, was effective in maintaining
population coverage, and ran for over 10 years from 1991
without the introduction of any other clinical targets.4
Who should decide on the indicators?
Clinicians whose performance is to be assessed should be
involved in selecting indicators, using systematic appraisal of
evidence and working with experts in technical construction of
valid and reliable indicators. The indicators themselves should
have strong face validity, either through an evidence base or
widespread professional consensus. The UK’s QOF ran into
problems in the late 2000s partly as a result of indicators being
introduced that had little professional consensus (eg, completing
a symptom inventory for patients with depression), seemed to
have a managerial rather than a clinical agenda (eg, incentives
designed to reduce emergency admissions), or had poorly
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Box 1: How the Quality and Outcomes Framework works
• The original scheme included 76 clinical indicators covering 10 conditions
• Data on clinical quality were extracted automatically from practice electronic records
• Doctors could exclude patients from individual clinical indicators (exception reporting) for specified reasons including clinical
inappropriateness, intolerance of medication, and patient dissent
• Organisational indicators included medical records, information for patients, education and training, practice management, and
medicines management
• Patient experience indicators related to conducting and acting on the results of patient experience surveys and offering booked
appointments of at least 10 minutes
Box 2: Examples of QOF indicators
Clinical process indicators
• Percentage of patients with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease who have had a review in the preceding 12 months, including an
assessment of breathlessness using the MRC dyspnoea scale
• Percentage of patients on lithium therapy with a record of serum creatinine and thyroid stimulating hormone in the preceding 9 months
Clinical intermediate outcomes
• Percentage of patients with coronary heart disease in whom the last blood pressure reading (measured in preceding 12 months) is
≤150/90 mm Hg
• Percentage of patients with diabetes whose last measured total cholesterol (measured within the preceding 12 months) is ≤5 mmol/L
Organisational indicators
• The practice has up-to-date clinical summaries in at least 70% of patient records
• A record of all clinical staff having attended training in basic life support skills in the preceding 18 months
Patient experience indicators
• Percentage of patients who indicate in a national survey that they were able to obtain a consultation with a GP within two working
days (England only)
• Practice will have undertaken an approved patient survey each year and, having reflected on the results, will produce an action plan
that sets priorities for the next two years, describes how the practice will report the findings to patients, and describes the plans for
achieving the priorities
constructed formulas linking performance to pay (eg, data from
patient surveys). The result was that GPs lost confidence in the
scheme.
Should doctors be able to exclude
patients?
It may be impossible to meet the requirements of quality
indicators if some patients decline treatment or follow-up.
Treatments or management suggested by clinical guidelines
may also be clinically inappropriate for individual patients. QOF
allows GPs to exclude (exception report) patients on the basis
of their clinical judgment or because patients fail to attend for
follow-up appointments. This was an important part of getting
buy-in from UK family doctors and reduces the risk of doctors
being given incentives to manage the patient in a way they
believe to be inappropriate.5An average of around 5% of patients
are excluded from individual QOF indicators by their GP, though
the figure varies widely between indicators.6 If doctors are
allowed to exclude patients, this should be monitored, with
doctors being prepared to justify the decisions made.
Is performance a useful way of paying
doctors?
The experience of pay-for-performance schemes across the
world is that they have less effect than payers hope for, and the
schemes should therefore be seen as one part of a wider quality
improvement strategy.7However, no payment system is perfect
and all have advantages and potential disadvantages (table).
This fact lies behind attempts to develop “blended” payment
systems designed to provide population coverage and good
access without compromising quality of care.
Pay for performance will also not generally be suitable for
improving care in patients with more complex problems, or the
wider determinants of personal health and health in society. For
important aspects of care that are not easily measurable (eg, for
patients with mental health problems and those with
multimorbidity and complex conditions), better mechanisms
are needed to ensure high quality care. Potential methods include
allowance for the additional time taken to provide good care
for such patients (as occurs in the Australian health service) and
encouraging doctors to engage more widely with the health and
social needs of patients—for example, through social prescribing
schemes.8
The formula linking performance to pay needs to be simple and
transparent and should encourage improvement at all levels up
to an agreed maximum threshold, ensuring that low performing
practices have an incentive to improve. “Tournament” schemes
providing payments for the highest scoring practices or groups
(eg, those performing in the top 10%) should be avoided as they
inappropriately penalise doctors if all practices reach high
standards of care (eg, if all practices meet 95% on a particular
quality marker). They also don’t provide incentives when all
providers need to improve or allow providers to plan and budget
ahead as the reward is dependent on the performance of other
providers.
Good data recording and reporting are essential for any
pay-for-performance scheme, and one positive effect of QOF
has been the development of comprehensive electronic records
and explicit collection and use of data for measuring quality.
This can be used to educate doctors and increase public
transparency about quality of care. However, it is not clear how
much payments add to feedback and public reporting of
performance in improving quality. Although small financial
rewards are probably less effective than large ones, the UK’s
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experience is that GPs have tried hard to get maximal points,
sometimes expending effort that was clearly beyond any
substantial benefit for themselves or their patients. Clinical
ambitions and reputations are important to doctors, and public
reporting of data on quality of care may itself act as a driver of
performance.
How often should schemes be revised or
changed?
The UK’s QOF was changed around every two years. Some
changes were minor (eg, changing the thresholds of individual
indicators) and some major (eg, dropping the organisational
indicators entirely). Experience from the UK suggests that
substantial changes should not occur more frequently than every
2-3 years in order to keep motivation among doctors. However,
there is also an argument for rotating conditions or indicators
to allow a wider spectrum of clinical conditions to be included.
In the UK, there has been constant pressure from patient and
professional groups to include more conditions in QOF as this
is seen as an effective way of gaining the attention of GPs.
A key question is when indicators that have been effective in
improving quality should be dropped. If pay for performance
is intended to improve quality, should payments be stopped
when maximum achievement on the indicators has been
sustained for some years? Or will quality then decline? The
answer is unclear.9 10 One solution may be to reduce quality
payments as indicators are rotated or withdrawn but require
limited ongoing data collection for a reduced set of indicators,
and at the same time require (and maybe incentivise) continued
and transparent data collection, potentially including areas where
there are no longer incentives for quality improvement.
What about unintended consequences?
Any incentive scheme, financial or otherwise, can have
unintended consequences. These can range from neglect of
conditions that are not included to gaming or outright fraud.
Policy makers and payers must understand the potential for
unintended or unexpected consequences, anticipate them as far
as possible, and be vigilant for them once a scheme is
introduced. Some of the QOF indicators that produced
unintended consequences are described in a linked paper.11
Larger incentives carry greater risk of perverse outcomes, and
the UK decided that deriving 25% of GPs’ income from QOF
was too much; it put too much focus on performance targets,
reduced the importance of the patient’s agenda, and potentially
reduced patient choices about the treatments they should receive.
Remuneration fromQOFwas reduced to around 15% of income
in 2013 and is likely to be reduced further. Box 3 sets out good
design principles that can help avoid adverse consequences.
Conclusions
There is no perfect system of paying for medical care, nor one
without potential unintended consequences, and there is an
argument for including some element of pay for performance
in medical care. However, the risks and unintended
consequences always need to be taken into account, as does the
organisational context into which incentives are introduced—for
example, whether to reward the individual, team, clinic, or
groups of practices; how that is likely to affect the behaviour
of individual clinicians; and how it will lead to improved care.
Research is needed on more sophisticated ways of using
indicators to improve quality of care and to evaluate the
introduction of pay for performance in different settings.12
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Box 3: Design principles for pay for performance schemes
• Pay for performance should be seen as part of wider quality improvement efforts.
• Public reporting of information on quality of care may be an effective driver of change without pay for performance
• Alternative strategies should be used to improve quality for aspects of care not easily measured to avoid them being neglected
• Single disease indicators may not be appropriate for important patient groups such as complex patients with multimorbidity
• Clinicians should be strongly represented among those selecting indicators and designing the programme
• Technical expertise in developing and implementing indicators is needed so that they measure what they are intended to measure
and reduce unintended consequences
• Indicators should represent aspects of quality that command wide professional support and, where available, be based on strong
scientific evidence
• Payments should be large enough to change behaviour but not so large as to divert excessive effort onto incentivised aspects of care
• The payment formula should encourage improvement at all levels up to an agreed maximum, ensuring that low performing providers
have an incentive to improve
• Unexpected consequences should be anticipated and continuously monitored
• The effect on inequalities in delivery of care should be monitored
Key messages
Pay for performance can be a useful part of wider programmes to improve quality of care, though quality gains from financial incentives
are generally modest
Clinicians must be closely involved in the development of quality indicators and pay-for-performance programmes
All incentive schemes (financial and non-financial) have the potential to produce unexpected or perverse outcomes, and these should
be anticipated and continuously monitored
Table
Table 1| Intended and unintended consequences of four methods of paying doctors
Potential unintended consequencesIntended outcomesPayment method
Provides no incentive to provide population coverage, improve
access, provide high quality care, or work beyond contracted
hours or duties
Provides a basic secure income, may be
especially important in hard to serve areas.
Salary: pay independent of workload or quality
Provides no incentive to provide good access if patients are
technically registered, or to improve quality of care
Provides coverage for the whole population:
promotes equity.
Capitation: pay according to number of people
on a doctor’s list
Tendency to over-provide, whether or not care is neededPrioritises meeting demandFee for service: pay for individual items of care
Neglect of aspects of care not measured or incentivisedImprovement in quality of carePay for performance: pay for meeting quality
targets
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